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NIGERIA STABILITY AND RECONCILIATION PROGRAMME

NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED LEGAL STUDIES



Jimtilo Community, (Exit Route from Maiduguri to Damaturu)

Dealing with the Past:

JUSTICE, RECONCILIATION AND HEALING IN THE NORTH EAST OF NIGERIA

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Justice, Reconciliation and Healing in the North East of Nigeria

July, 2017

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Acknowledgements

This research was led by Professor Adedeji Adekunle, the Director-General of NIALS with a research team which included Ogwuche Pius Ocheme; Aisha Aliyu; Eric Siben; Dr. Yagana Bukar; Mohammed Ali Mechanic; Bashir Umar; Danladi Hamissu; Staff of the Yobe State University, Damaturu, Babagana Boso; Dr. Hadiza Mali; Hussaina Samaila and NIALS staff members: Professor Peter Akper SAN, Dr. Ibe Ifeakandu; Dr. Irekpitan Okukpon; Emeka Odum; Oluchi Amadi-Azoro and Esther Hatsiwa

We also acknowledge the support of the NSRP Research Quality Assurance team namely Dr. Ukoha Ukiwo, Priscilla Ankut, Habiba Makanjuola, Kimairis Toogood, Amy Harrison, Mustapha Shettima, Nuhu Ndahi and the NIALS Research Monitoring team which includes Dr Oladipo Ipadeola, Professor Joy Ezeilo, and Dr Ozonnia Ojielo.

At the inception of the research and in the writing of the report, their critical inputs and expertise led to the successful development and review of the tools, methodology and data analysis. Their critical inputs and reviews of the team also helped in shaping and reporting the research findings. The research is implemented by the NSRP in partnership with the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (NIALS). The study is supported by funding from the Department for International Development (DFID). NSRP consortium partners also supported the study. They includethe British Council, International Alert and Social Development Direct (SDD). We are extremely grateful to the men, women, community leaders, traditional rulers, government representatives and NGOs who took their valuable time to speak to the research team and share their views and experiences.

Finally, we would like to state that the findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the NSRP or NIALS or the opinions and policies of NSRP's donors or partners.

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Acronyms

AG	Attorney General
JAS	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawatiwal-Jihad (JAS)
ICRC	International Committee of Red Cross
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CIDR	Centre for Integrated Development & Research
CJTF	Civilian Joint Task Force
CLO	Civil Liberty Organisation
CPN	Child Protection Network
SCO	Chief Security Officer
DIA	Defence Intelligence Agency
DMI	Directorate of Military Intelligence
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDI	In-depth Interviews
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organisation
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
JTF	Joint Task Force
KII	Key Informant Interviews
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
NACTEST	National Counter Terrorism Strategy
NCS	Nigerian Customs Service
NCWS	National Council for Women Societies
NHRC	National Human Rights Commission
NE	North East
NEMA	National Emergency Management Authority
NIA	Nigeria Intelligence Agency
NIS	Nigeria Immigration Service
NPF	Nigerian Police Force
NSRP	Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme
NSCDC	National Security and Civil Defence Corps
ONSA	Office of the National Security Adviser
PLWD	People Living with Disabilities
PPG	Rocket Propelled Grenades
SEMA	State Emergency Management Authority
SSRP	Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Insurgency poses a major threat to national security. It hinders development and undermines the rule of law, human rights principles and good governance. It also makes women, girls, and marginalised groups even more vulnerable to violence and the rollback of their rights. It is discomforting for a country or any part of its territory to be under siege by armed groups. This was the situation the Federal Government of Nigeria found itself when militant group *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awatiwal-Jihad* (JAS), often referred to as Boko Haram, was perpetrating extreme violence on some parts of the North East that were under their control. It is reported that since 2009 when the group heightened its terrorist operations in the North East, about 20,000 civilians lost their lives, about 3 million people are internally displaced, over USD6 million of public funds have been spent on prosecuting the counter-terrorism war while the cost of recovery and peace building is estimated to USD 6.7 billion. An estimated 75% of children are out of school.

This Study sought to evaluate perceptions and views of victims, community dwellers, parents and other key stakeholders on reconciliation and healing with a view to guiding initiatives towards the rehabilitation of displaced persons and sustainable peace in the North east. The research was situated in the two North Eastern States of Yobe and Borno. It was financed by the Nigerian Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) and carried out by the Nigerian institute of Advanced Legal Studies (NIALS). This report is based on data gathered in February March and April 2017 by administering questionnaires to a cross section of respondents including internally displaced persons (IDPs), parents community leaders, security personnel, and policy makers. 50% of the questionnaires in each state were administered on female respondents. Data was also collated through a total of 6 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and 3 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) in each state.

The study looked at all-inclusive measures that can be adopted to stimulate peace, reconciliation and stability; and examines how implementation can be conducted in an inclusive manner, including addressing the needs of women, children, people living with disabilities, and other vulnerable groups. This research also sought to identify potential strategies and programmes that could contribute to the achievement of enduring peace in the Northeast.

Accordingly, the key findings of the research are:

- A majority of respondents believe that JAS has the greatest blame for the violence and death experienced in Borno and Yobe states. Unconditional forgiveness of the insurgents is not an acceptable option for majority of respondents in the North East;

- Religion and religious sentiments that promote peace and forgiveness are key factors that have contributed to stabilising the psychosocial balance of victims in the North East geopolitical zone;

- Healing is a welcome prospect for respondents in the North East, and centres for psychosocial support and medical therapy for victim which are already in existence are a continued necessity;

- Healing and rehabilitation of victims is key to achieving justice and peace in the North East. Respondents believed that while healing could be best achieved through establishment of therapy and psychosocial centres, the rehabilitative process can be best done by providing means of livelihood and skills for the victims;
- A majority of respondents are resolute in their insistence on justice and accountability, particularly the successful prosecution of apprehended insurgents and criminal punishment of apprehended or repentant JAS insurgents as critical to the drive towards justice, healing and reconciliation;

- A majority of respondents expressed scepticism about the sincerity of repentant or de-radicalised insurgents. They caution against amnesty for any insurgent and advise caution in efforts to rehabilitate apprehended JAS members in their former communities. Indeed the victims of the JAS insurgency are averse towards living in the same community as repentant JAS insurgents with many still nursing thoughts of revenge towards the JAS;

- The idea of de-radicalizing insurgents is not a priority for most of the respondents as the preferable option is increased provision of basic amenities, particularly food, water and clothing in IDP camps.

The preponderant view is that the JAS insurgency is not fueled by religious ideologies but by fanaticism and poverty. The JAS targets jobless youths and young girls/women between the ages of 18 and 30 years. Several discussants also believed that the crisis had historical roots and that this belief and religion contributed to a sense of resignation and submission to the events as destined to happen

Any effort aimed at enduring peace, reconciliation and stability must in addition to these socio-cultural factors consider the role and respective concerns of various strategic actors, and the very diverse needs of victims.

1. BACKGROUND

Despite the considerable progress made in development and peace consolidation in parts of West Africa (and in some instances, the notable democratic and socio-economic advances),structural deficiencies and a history of violent national civil conflict in countries such as Nigeria have perpetuated the region's insecurity and vulnerability to emerging threats. These vulnerabilities include weak border control systems; the inability of criminal justice systems to uphold therule of law; inadequate coordination and information-sharing among relevant national agencies; and limited institutional cooperation with neighbouring countries. The above weaknesses are, in part, a result of years of economic mismanagement and lack of social investment, exacerbated by civil wars, which in some contexts have significantly diminished human capital, social infrastructure and productive national development assets. The historical factors of corrosive nationalism and diverse colonial inheritance, with different legislative and cultural affiliations, as well as different national territories that often disrupted traditional ethnic groups (and some with historical animosities), have also contributed significantly to the vulnerability. These vulnerabilities seem to have exposed the West African sub-region to the emergence of relatively new threats to peace and security and to undermine regional capacity to respond adequately to the threats posed by drug trafficking, insurgency, terrorism and piracy.[1]

The dynamic of Nigeria's peace and security landscape changed with the emergence of the *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awatiwal Jihad* (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad) movement, referred to in this report JAS, and its insurgency from 2009.[2]JAS, similar to other ethno-political militias in post-1999 Nigeria emerged against the backdrop of deepening poverty, socio-economic deprivation, corruption, poor governance, police brutality and governance failures at multiple levels.[3] Northern Nigeria is confronted with an extremely low level of infrastructural and human capacity development evidenced by the low level of education and high level of unemployment, particularly among the youth.[4] This situation of relative deprivation led BBC Africa analyst Richard Hamilton to conclude that 'it is perhaps no surprise that extremist groups, such as JAS, continue to

1 UN Security Council Report 'Emerging Security Threats in West Africa' Special Research Report No.1, 2, available at *http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-6740225.php*, accessed on 27 April 2017.

2. Kobena T Hanson (ed) *Contemporary Regional Development in Africa* (Routledge, 2016) 206.

3. P Rogers (2012) 'Nigeria: The Generic Context of the Boko Haram Violence' Oxford Research Group, *Monthly Global Security Briefing*, April 1; Kobena (n 1) 206.

4 Arnim Langer, Amelie Godefroidt & Bart Meuleman 'Killing People, Dividing a Nation? Analyzing Student Perceptions of the Boko Haram Crisis in Nigeria' (2017) 40 (5) *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 423.

have an appeal in northern parts of the country, where poverty and underdevelopment are at their most severe.'[5]
Under the leadership of Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, the activities of the sect gained momentum in the North Eastern part of Nigeria. However, after his alleged extrajudicial killing by police officers in 2009, Mallam Sanni Umaru assumed leadership,[6]and the organisation'sreligious radicalization ideology changed to the preaching of hate, vengeance, and the justification of martyrdom.[7] Over time, several persons claimed headship of JAS until a more radical and violent splinter group under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau relocated to Yobe State. With the death of Yusuf at the hands of the Nigerian authorities in 2009, the group's tactics progressed to more indiscriminate massattacks against government and civilians, which were increasingly lethal and targeted far wider geographical areas.[8] Such tactics included conventional and suicide bomb attacks, hit-and-run raids on villages, and the capture of larger towns in the northeast of the country.[9] Between 2000 and 2009, these attacks also targeted national infrastructure andinstitutions, and international organizations such as the Nigerian Police Headquarters, the United Nations House in Abuja,and other local places such as markets, banks, shopping complexes and churches.[10]Furthermore, in 2013, JAS insurgentsattacked a Federal Government Secondary School in Buni Yadi, Yobe State and shot or burned 59 pupils to death.[11]

JAS has also perpetrated widespread violence against women and girls.[12]The groupattained global notoriety in April 2014 when they kidnapped nearly 300 girls from Government Secondary School, Chibok in Borno State. Apart from the ordeal of the abduction, some of these girls were subjected to rape and

5 BBC News, "Nigerians Living in Poverty Rise to Nearly 61%," BBC News, 13 February 2012, available at *http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17015873*, accessed on 18 April 2017.

6 Langer *et al* (n 4) 421.

7 ONSA Policy Brief 'Violent radicalisation in northern Nigeria: Economy & Society' at 7, available at *http://www.nsrp-nigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/PB-5-Economy-and-Society.pdf*, accessed on 13th May 2017.

8 NSRP/UNICEF 'Perceptions and Experiences of Children Associated with Armed Groups in NorthEast Nigeria' Research Report 2017, 9.

9 Iro Aghedo and Oarhe Osumah, 'The Boko Haram Uprising: How Should Nigeria Respond?,' (2012) 33(5) *Third World Quarterly* pp. 853–869; Amnesty International, 'Boko Haram at a Glance' available at *https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/01/boko-haram-glance/*, accessed 21 April 2017.

10 Langer *et al* (n 4) 424.

11 Joe Hemba 'Nigerian Islamists kill 59 pupils in boarding school attack,' Feb 26 2014, available at *http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-violence-idUSBREA1P10M20140226*, accessed on 23 April 2017; Mark Memmott 'More Than Two Dozen Boys Killed in Attack on Nigerian School' Feb 25 2014, available at *http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/02/25/282405160/more-than-two-dozen-boys-killed-in-attack-on-nigerian-school*, accessed 23 April 2017.

12 Christiana E Attah 'Boko Haram and sexual terrorism: The conspiracy of silence of the Nigerian anti- terrorism laws' (2016) 16 *African Human Rights Journal* 388.

physical violence, often on a daily basis.[13] These abductions and rapes committed by JAS members constitute criminal offences and violations of the human rights of the victims as guaranteed in Chapter 4 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).[14]It should also be noted that JAS's use of physical and sexual violence against women and girls was commonplace before the abduction of the Chibok girls. More recently, there has been a growing trend of the use of female suicide bombers as part of JAS's terror activities.

Following negotiations between the Nigerian government and JAS, largely facilitated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Swiss government, 21 of the nearly 300 Chibok girls were released by JAS in October 2016. The rescued girls narrated their experiences of rape and violence to the government, with some of the girls found to be pregnant. The high number of pregnancies among the girls raises questions as to whetherthese pregnancies resulted from a deliberate plan by JASof some form.[15] Nevertheless, the pervading culture of silence with regards to rape in Nigeria in order to avoid stigmatisation by other members of the society may be a limiting factor in attempting to gauge the extent of the violence meted out to women and girls.

The nature of weapons used by the insurgents and nature of their attacks became more sophisticated during this period, evolving from the use of bows and arrows, dane guns, and old AK-47s to sophisticated AK-47s, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), anti-aircraft guns, mortars and shoulder-held surface to air missiles, suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[16]The scale of the insurgency has transcended Nigeria and developed into a regional security challenge which has manifested in the use of the territories of neighbouring countries including Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Mali and Mauritania, as recruitment, operational and training bases or safe havens. There is also a demonstrable link to other insurgencies in the Sahel (border areas in northern Mali, Mauritania and Algeria).[17] Consequently, Nigeria's response has evolved from police action (Phase One) to limited

13 Philip Obaji Jr 'Boko Haram's rescued sex slaves tell their horror stories,' available at *http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/06/boko-haram-horror-stories-told-by-rescued-girls-in-nigeria.html*, accessed 20 April 2017; Obinna Akukwe 'Chibok girls, Boko Haram and Jihad of the penis,' available at *https://247ureports.com/2014/07/10/chibok-girls-boko-haram-and-jihad-of-the-penis-by-obinna-akukwe/*, accessed 19 April 2017.

14 Sections 35, 37 – 41, 1999 Constitution.

15 Attah (n 12) 389.

16 A. Walker 'What is Boko Haram?' United States Institute of Peace, *Special Report 308,* June 2012.

17 US State Department *Country Reports on Terrorism 2012* Washington, D.C: US State Department, 2012, available at http://www.state.gov/09-13-13-Boko-Haram-Report.pdf, accessed April 17 2017; Kobena (n 2) 208.

police-army security operation (Phase Two) and large scale joint security to take place between the group's members and civilian JTF members.[18]

The Nigerian government appears to have responded strongly to the insurgency through combined efforts of the State Security Services (SSS), Nigeria Intelligence Agency (NIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) aimed at providing reliable security intelligence.The SSS is the main security agency responsible for investigating and gathering intelligence geared towards preventing and detecting terrorist threats from organizations such as JAS. The efforts of the Agency have been instrumental in curbing terrorist activitiesin the North East. Similarly, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), which was established as a regional security cooperation mechanism at the May 2014 Paris Summit on JAS, comprises security forces from Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon.[19]

At the political level, the Nigerian governmentresponded with the passage of a counter-terrorism legislation, the Terrorism Prevention Act in 2011 and its Amendment Act of 2013, which prohibits all acts of terrorism and the financing of terrorism.[20] The Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) is designated as the coordinating body for all security and enforcement agencies under the Act.[21]The legislation also lists offences which are referred to as 'terrorist acts' and attract penalties ranging from a ten year jail term to life imprisonment. In April 2013, the government inaugurated an Amnesty Committee on JAS to contact and explore dialogue with members of JASand grant amnesty where appropriate.[22]As already observed, this effort resulted in the release of 21 girls kidnapped in 2016.

International humanitarian organisations such as Amnesty International also reported in 2014 on the effectiveness of the collaborative efforts and methods employed by the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian military and the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Borno and Yobe states to counter JAS. Consequently, it is evident that from 2014 to date, the collaborative efforts of the SSS, Joint Task Force (JTF), Civilian Joint Task Force (Borno), Hunters/Vigilante groups (Damaturu), Nigerian Customs Service (NCS), Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) and the National Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA), State Emergency Management

18 'Boko Haram kills 25 civilian-JTF members in Borno' sunnewsonline.com, July 29, 2013, The Sun in Hanson (n 2) at 208.

19. The MJTF has also been instrumental to the successes recording in the counter terrorism effort as a result of the increased bilateral intelligence sharing tool and assistance in border management, amongst others. The operations of the MJTF have been targeted at disrupting operational camps of JAS cells, denying insurgents safe havens, cutting off supply routes and tracking cross-border movements.

20 S. 1 Terrorism Prevention Amendment Act of 2013.

21 S.1 (A) (1).

22 'Boko Haram: Jonathan sets up Amnesty Committee,' The Vanguard, April 5 2013, available at *http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/04/boko-haram-jonathan-sets-up-amnesty-committee/*, accessed 22 April 2017.

Authority (SEMA) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have contributed towards substantially reducingthe insurgency.

This report sought to determine the extent to which justice and the accountability measures against insurgents impact the process of healing of victims, their families and reconciliation. The research project focused on the perceptions of these actors regarding the notion of justice and the possibility of acceptance and reconciliation with JAS insurgents who are deradicalized. Statistics place the total number of fatalities of the JAS insurgency in Nigeria to a total of 32,842 from 1 June 2006 to 31 May 2016.[23] The families of those killed or subjected to violence by JAS are affected by trauma. The research project reveals that despite the relative declineof violence by JAS in Borno and Yobe States between 2015 and 2017, there is dissatisfaction among victims regarding the way justice has been meted out on apprehended JAS members by the government. At the community level, residents and traditional leaders are faced with challenges regarding provision of basic services, security, medical and pscychosocial services to traumatized victims, particularly amidst the social disintegration caused by JAS.This researchhighlights the challenges of reintegrating deradicalized participants, and affected populations, into communities. These challenges stem from the unwillingness of victims and community leaders to live in the same community as deradicalized participants, and a lack of confidence in the government - particularly around the authenticity of the process of ensuring that the former JAS members are really deradicalized and not merely informants.

This research projectprovides insights into perceptions of communities towards the JAS insurgency in Borno and Yobe States; the challenges encountered in the pursuit of justice, peace and healing for victims; factors mitigating against reintegration of deradicalized participants (victims and insurgents) into their communities; the protection of women, children and physically challenged individuals, and the role of government in tackling the insurgency in the past and present, and mechanisms for the future.

23. NSRP *Nigeria Watch Sixth Report on Violence in Nigeria* (2016) at 11, available at http://www.nigeriawatch.org/media/html/NGA-Watch-Report16V7.pdf, accessed on 21 July 2017.

2. METHODOLOGY

The Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (NIALS) and the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) – comprising three consortium partners, International Alert, Social Development Direct (SDD) and the British Council – conducted research on the means of dealing with the effects of the activities of the JAS insurgents on the people, both in the past and present, and sought to understandpeople's perceptions with regards to justice, reconciliation and healing in the North East of Nigeria.

The research, carried out between February and April 2017, covered two North-Eastern states: Borno and Yobe. These two States were chosen because they account for majority of the insurgency attacks in the North East, particularly Borno State. On June 12 2017, four JAS suicide bombers killed 19 people in a series of attacks targeted at Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and people gathered to mourn the deaths of others at a mosque in Borno State.[24] A week later, the Borno State Police Command confirmed that another attack took place in Kofa Community of Maiduguri where 17 people were killed, including five female suicide bombers.[25] Similarly, in January 2016, JAS perpetrated an attack around Baga, a fishing settlement in Borno state, North-East Nigeria, killing at least 2,000 people and sacking the military base of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).Also on 26 July 2016, a 10-year-old girl blew herself up in a busy market in Damaturu, Yobe state, killing at least 15 persons and injuring 46 others.[26]Other north east states such as Adamawa were excluded from the research, to allow for greater concentration in Borno as the state most affected by the insurgency..Yobe State was also included because of the migration of victims of JAS to that State and the sudden incidents of violence by JAS therein. The devastation caused by the JAS conflict in both states ostensibly gave rise to almost 7 million people (mostly children) requiring humanitarian assistance.[27]

Within Borno and Yobe States, the research was conducted in the state capitals (Maiduguri and Damaturu respectively) for two main reasons: (a) security: researchers could not access communities in the hinterland due to lack of security backup; and (b) most displaced persons from the rural communities migrated to Damaturu and Maiduguri, where they were

24. Ndahi Marama 'Police confirms 17 dead, others injured in Borno five female suicide attacks' The Vanguard, june 12, 2017, available at http://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/06/police-confirms-17-dead-others-injured-borno-five-female-suicide-attacks/
25. Haruna Umar '19 killed in Boko Haram attacks in northern Nigeria city' Associated Press, July 12, 2017, available at http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/19-killed-boko-haram-attacks-northern-nigeria-city-48584034, accessed on 21 July 2017.
26 Human Rights Watch 'Nigeria – Events of 2015' available at *https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/nigeria*, accessed on 10May 2017.
27 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 'About the crisis' available at *http://www.unocha.org/nigeria/about-ocha-nigeria/about-crisis,* accessed on 15 May 2017.

interviewed in the IDPs camps and host communities. Data collection in both states took place in areas ranging from Mairi to Bama Road to Gambole (Borno State), and from Pompomari IDP camps to Fulatari Village to Sabon Pegi (Damaturu). The particular choice of research location in these rural areas was determined by proximity to the IDP camps and the offices of the various government officials/traditional rulers and non-governmental organisations.

The research project utilized research instruments including questionnaires and key informant interviews (KIIs). The percentage distribution ratio per state was 50% women, 30% male youths under age 18[28] and 20% men over the age of 18.

The questionnaires were administered according to the data below:

Target A – Yobe State

S/N	TARGETS	NO. OF RESPONDENTS	TOTAL DISTRIBUTION RATIO
1.	IDPs	600	950 Respondents 50% Women 30% Youth
2.	Hunters/Vigilante Group	50	
3.	De-radicalised Participants (Victims and Insurgents)	150	
4.	Officials (SEMA, NEMA, etc)	150	

Target B – Yobe State

S/N	TARGETS	NO. OF RESPONDENTS	TOTAL DISTRIBUTION RATIO
1.	Parents	150	550 Respondents 50% Women
2.	Community	350	
3.	Security (NSCDC, Peace Corps, Nigerian Army, etc)	50	

28. Male youths in this research project were categorised to be between 16 and 35 years of age. Generally, a youth in Nigeria, whether male or female is classified as being between 16 – 30 years of age.

Target A – Borno State

S/N	TARGETS	NO. OF RESPONDENTS	TOTAL DISTRIBUTION RATIO
1.	IDPs	600	950 Respondents 50% Women 30% Youth (18 – 35 years)
2.	Hunters/Vigilante Group	50	
3.	Deradicalised Participants (Victims and Insurgents)	150	
4.	Officials (SEMA, NEMA, etc)	150	

Target B – Borno State

S/N	TARGETS	NO. OF RESPONDENTS	TOTAL DISTRIBUTION RATIO
1.	Parents	200	750 Respondents 50% Women
2.	Community	400	
3.	Security (NSCDC, Peace Corps, Nigerian Army, etc)	150	

The initial distribution ratio target for questionnaires administrationwas 1500 questionnaires for Yobe State and 1700 for Borno State. However, a total of 3,202 questionnaires were administered simultaneouslyin both states, with 1800 administered in Borno State and 1402 questionnaires administered in Yobe State. Key informant interviews (KII) were also carried out in Borno and Yobe States. In Borno State, 48 respondents were interviewed, while in Yobe State, 20 respondents were interviewed. The respondents included government officials, security agencies, leaders of the civilian joint task force (CJTF) and vigilante groups, community leaders, religious organisations,IDP camp coordinators involved in counter-insurgency and victim support programmes. On account of restricted access no de-radicalised participants (victims and insurgents) were interviewed in either State.

Before each questionnaire was administered, the purpose of the research project was explained to the respondents. The consent of each respondent was sought and obtained before each interview, including an assurance of confidentiality as to the identity of the respondent. The same procedure was employed during the administration of the IDIs on key informants.

There were also fourfocus groups in each of the research locations (Maiduguri and Damaturu) namely Group A: Community/Parents/Elders; Group B: Victims/IDPs; Group C: Security/Law Enforcement[29] and Group D: Public Officers. These groups were identified by the research team leaders in both Statesduring the course of carrying out the questionnaires and KIIsin both states. These groups consisted of women between the ages of 18 and 35 years, men between 35 – 75 years, and male youths between 18 and 35 years.

The field researchers encountered some challenges during the process, the most daunting of which was the request for food and financial aid by respondents at the IDP camps before the administration of the questionnaires. The field researchers were able to overcome this challenge by refocusing the people's expectation towards achieving lasting peace in the State through the provision of accurate responses.

29. Security/Law Enforcement in this regard refers to officials of the Nigerian Immigration Service, Nigerian Customs Service, Hunter/Vigilante Group, Civilian Joint Task Force and Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC)

3. PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE JAS

The research sought to determine the perceptions of respondents towards members of JAS, especially regarding their humanity. A majority of the respondents viewed the members of JAS as human beings rather than animals. This particular question sought to elicit from respondents bases for reconciliation if any The justification for the violent acts of JAS can be gleaned from Waller's notion that 'people do not ordinarily engage in extraordinary evil until they have justified to themselves the morality of their actions.'[30] Straus argues that 'particular circumstances can cause people to commit harm they might not have not otherwise have been predisposed to commit…In groups and in particular circumstances, ordinary men can change.'[31] Comparing this situation to the case of the killings which occurred during the Rwandan genocide in 1994, it can be argued that if individuals are to be held accountable for their crimes, they need to be seen as human beings who committed acts of violence within a specific context..[32]This view is supported by Tutu who argues vis-à-vis apartheid in South Africa that:

> …if the perpetrators were to be despaired of as monsters and demons, then we were thereby letting accountability go out the window by declaring that they were not moral agents to be held accountable for their deeds. Much more importantly, it meant that we abandoned all hope of their being able to change for the better.[33]

The general perception of people towards JAS is that they are a violent group. Almost all respondents had heard of the JAS, with a majority admitting that they had one or two personal encounters ranging from sexual abuse and various other forms of assault to death of a family member, or loss of properties due to the insurgency.

In Borno and Yobe States respectively, 35.1% and 34.4% of respondents reported experiencing sexual abuse from JAS, 72.8% respondents in Borno and 70.8% of respondents in Yobe experienced destruction of properties as a result of the insurgency.

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30. James Waller *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killings* (Oxford: University Press, 2007) in Janine Clark 'Learning from the Past: Three Lessons from the Rwandan Genocide' (2009) 68 (1) *African Studies* at 8, available at http://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/doi/pdf/10.1080/00020180902827340?needAccess=true, accessed on 21 July 2017.
31. Scott Straus 'How Many Perpetratrs were there in the Rwandan Genocide? An Estimate' (2004) 6 (1) *Journal of Genocide Research*, 85 – 98 in Clark (n 39) 8.
32. Clark (n 31) 9.
33. Desmond Tutu *No Future without Forgiveness* (London: Rider, 1999) in Clark (n 39) 9.





Figure 1: Type of violence experienced disaggregated by state

A cursory look at the figures depicted in the chart in Figure 1 reveals an upward trend in the number of deaths and destruction of property in Yobe, even though Borno has a more protracted experience with insurgency than Yobe. This could be because manyof the IDPs interviewed in Yobe State migrated from communities in Borno State, and this accounts for more deaths and destruction of property in Yobe than Borno State.

Regarding the type of violence experienced by the respondents based on gender, 46.1 % of females compared to 53.9% of the male respondents were reported experiencing sexual assault from JAS, while 53.3% of the male respondents as opposed to 46.7 % of the female respondents experienced destruction of properties as a result of insurgency. Similar gender differences were observed among respondents' answers to 'experience of violence,' 'assault' and 'death of family member'.[34] This is depicted in Figure 2.



34 Report of the NSRP/ NIALS Data Analyst, , p. 4.

Figure 2: Type of violence experienced disaggregated by gender

Respondents to questionnaires expressed a mixture of fear and anger at the mention of JAS. The majority of respondents viewedJAS members as human beings like themselves. However a few described them as working under the influence of an evil spirit. Nonetheless, most find it impossible to understand how a group could inflict such violence on fellow human beings.The majority (72.5%) expressed a lack of empathy at the prospect of JAS members being made to serve criminal punishment for their crimes.[35] The other 27.5% believe that not all members of JAS participate in the violence and therefore pleaded for members of the group to be considered and held individually culpable for the roles they played.

Some boys were abducted and coerced into joining the Group and may not be directly involved in the violence... -*Interview with a male member of the Jerusalem community in Damaturu, 20th February 2017*

JAS members are human beings but they operate like people who are possessed by evil spirits... – *Interview with a female member of the Jerusalem community in Damaturu, 17th February 2017*

Respondents of KIIs and FGDs queried the possibility ofde-radicalising people who have committed such crimes as killing their own parents and abducting their siblings. More than 66% of respondents in Borno and Yobe States do not believe a member of JAS can truly be repentant or de-radicalised. When asked what they would do if they saw a repentant member of the groupaccosted by an angry mob, a slight majority (as shown in Table 1 below)said that they would join the mob while a few others said they would help the JAS member owing to their religious beliefs, which forbids revenge. These few others also form the 35% who believe that they could begin to forgive repentant members of the group.[36] Table 3 shows contrasting perceptions of prospects for reconciliation between displaced persons and residents in the community.

35 Report of the NSRP/ NIALS Data Analyst, p.5.

36 Report of the NSRP/ NIALS Data Analyst, p.10.




Table 3 – Perceptions on healing process among respondents by displacement status

How can we trust that they are truly repentant and changed...? – *Interview with a member of the community in Damaturu, 13th February, 2017.*

They came to look for me and when they didn't find me, they killed my first daughter right here in my house. How can I forgive them? I have vowed to kill them...we have been killing them...'- *Interview with Male Head of the Hunter/Vigilante group in Damaturu, 13th February 2017*

We will not live with them, or trust them; they killed our people and relations. We will not return and live with them in the same community forever. If government tries to do this, it would create more harm than good. Let government find a place different from where they commit atrocity to settle them–Male *Participant at the FGD held in Damaturu, Yobe State, 12th April 2017*

Table 1 – Respondents state of mind on JAS for both states

General perceptions on JAS	Number	Percentage
Believe members of JAS are human too	2609	86.8
Believe that not all members of JAS participate in violence	874	29.1
I would feel no sympathy if I saw a member of JAS suffer	2127	72.3
I would not help a repentant JAS member	1986	66.1
I would work with repentant members of JAS	973	32.4
I often think about revenge	1569	52.2
I could begin to forgive the members of JAS	1063	35.4

Respondents blamed the activities of the groupon the preaching of their erstwhile cleric/leader Mohammed Yusuf whom they said stirred his followers against western education. Christian communities in Borno and Yobe states (who constitute 15% of respondents) believe that the violence was initially motivated by negative religious teaching while others attributed it to the high level of unemployment in the state which caused many to be unable to fend for themselves. [37]

...the crisis in the beginning started as religious but later it was discovered that it was not religious when they started killing Muslims as much as Christians...
– Female Participant, FGD Group A (Community/Parents/Victims)Maiduguri, Borno State, 12thApril, 2017.

...the major motivating factor to engage in physical violence is unemployment...government needs to be proactive to avert similar incidences otherwise the problems of unemployment will continue to serve as a catalyst for social vices and terrorism in the state – Male *Participant, FGD Group A (Community/Parents/Victims), Maiduguri, Borno State, 12hApril, 2017*

..Some politicians in the state used this group of youths for political ends especially during electoral processes...I was captured by members of the sect in Gwoza. They said that they were given ₦50, 000,000 (fifty million naira) to destroy Gwoza and that was how my exile tragedy started. I was beaten and maltreated...then I fled Gwoza through Madgadali to Mubi on foot - *Female participant, FGDGroup A(Community/Parents/Victims),Maiduguri, Borno State, 12April, 2017*

Furthermore, other factors like poor parental control, political manipulation of youths for selfish interests and social norms that portray 'white-collar' jobs as the only means of livelihood were identified during the KIIs and FGDs as the driving force of the insurgency. In general, it was observed that a slightly higher number of respondents in Yobe State held negative perceptions ofJAS when compared to respondents in Borno State even though there were minimal demographic differences in the types of violence experienced by respondents in both states as graphically depicted earlier in Figure 1[38]

37 Excerpts from FGD Report, Yobe State, p. 3.
38 Report of the NSRP/ NIALS Data p.3.




Figure 4: Punitive opinion about JAS by displacement status

Displacement of Persons as a Result of theInsurgency

The research also sought to understand the number of people who could be described as 'currently displaced', 'previously displaced' or 'never displaced.' Whilst administering the questionnaires in the IDP camps, it was observed that the highest number of respondents were between the ages of 16 and 30 years, representing about 47.9% of total number of respondents. (Figure 5) Furthermore, more male (57.9%) than female (42.1%) respondents were resident there at the time of the study.




Figure 5. Representation of displaced respondents by age group.

Accordingly, whilst about 45% of the respondents were living in IDP camps in both states at the time of the study, the remaining 12% were living in their homes with another 17% staying with relatives or at worship centres, and the remaining 22% living in makeshift/temporary accommodation. Combined, these figures indicate that almost 90% of respondents have been displaced from their homes at some point in the insurgency. The major factors

preventing respondents from returning to their homes ranged from lack of finance to rebuild destroyed homes,to lack of a social amenities and perceived insecurity, especially in suburban areas of the states.




Figure 6: Displacement status by State




Figure7: Current living status by state

There was a noticeable migration of people from rural and suburban communities to communities within the urban areas of both states for safety and improved welfare access. These migrants comprise farmers and petty traders who abandoned their farm lands and market stalls as a result of the insurgency, which they described as being at its worst in the rural areas and suburbs.

Apart from the government-manned IDP Camps, there were pockets of IDPsliving withhost communities. Accommodation in these settings was typically very basic, with IDPs residing in makeshift houses constructed from

straw that did not provide protection from rain or cold. Such houses were typically without electricity or running water.
Without being formally classified as IDPs, it was observed that these people were dependent on government, NGO's, INGO's and other charitable organisations for welfare and necessary amenities. This was particularly true given the widespread loss of shops and businesses to the insurgency, making it even more difficult for displaced people to provide for themselves.

Elimination of Foreign Investment in the North East

The JAS crisis has severely impacted not only individuals in the North East, but the prospects of foreign investments in the region. Foreign investors and manufacturers have fled the North East as a result of the insecurity caused by the insurgency, further crippling the economic productivity of smaller businesses that depended on them. With a little over 40% of the respondents having attained one, two or three level(s) of education, most of whom stopped at secondary level, more than 50% have had no form of education whatsoever. Consequently, only about 6% claim to have paid employment, while 18% are either students or simply unemployed. The larger population (74.8%) of people include petty traders, business owners and farmers. These businesses and farmlands are either just recovering or still suffering under the hardship caused by insurgency.

Food Insecurity and Inadequacy of Resources

The impact of the insurgency on farming and trading activities, and the increasing reliance on welfare and relief materials, has contributed significantly to food insecurity in both states. This has been further compounded by increased insecurity of food supply chains from neighbouring states, with poor road networks and lack of security presence on most routes increasing the risk of attacks by insurgents.
KIIs with community leaders in Yobe State, particularly *Kukareta* IDP camp, reveal that the overcrowding of the IDP Camps and host communities has put a noticeable strain on food and infrastructure. The community leaders stated that available food resources and existing health care and educational facilities are insufficient to satisfy the needs of the large number of IDPs[39], resulting inmalnutrition, increased mortality rates and a higher number of school aged children unable to attend schools.

Sexual Violence of Women and Girls

Over 34% of women and girls sampled in both Yobe and Borno States attest to having experienced sexual abuse as a result of the insurgency. These girls appeared traumatised and withdrawn. However, some female respondents who were once abducted by the insurgents did not report having been physically or sexually assaulted by the insurgents. This disclosure is an indication that not all sexual abuses may have been perpetrated by JAS. On

39. KII with community leader, rural IDP camp, Damaturu, Yobe State, 18 February 2017.

further enquiry into what government is doing to support victims of sexual violence, a female leader of a women's group in Yobe State stated:

> ***You can quote me anywhere...the sensitivities of women and girls have to be taken seriously. Some of these traumatised girls are kept in overcrowded IDP camps where they are further exposed to rape and abuse.***[40]

THE DYNAMICS OF RE-BUILDING COMMUNITIES

Provision of Basic Services

The JAS insurgency in Borno and Yobe States appears to be weakening. Basic amenities such as water sanitation were noted by the respondents to have improved when compared to a year or two ago. Areas such as health and education were also noted to have been enhanced with government funding. Respondents acknowledged that the heavy presence of security operatives in volatile areas of the state has lessened the insecurity. However, there is scepticismat community level about the extent to which JAS's strength is dwindling, in light of recent news of intermittent female suicide bombings, and the discovery of bomb making factories and land mines. While most of the respondents believe the insurgency is gradually coming to an end, others believe that the end is still not in sight. [41]

Nevertheless, improvements in the lives of the people have been recorded with a few respondents being able to return to their homes and rebuild-destroyed property with government support and funding. Areas such as health, education,water and sanitation have improved since 2009. Most of the respondents are optimistic about the current situation and believe this can be sustained through concerted efforts of the security agencies, local vigilantes and cooperation of the people.

. ...There is still no peace in some parts of Gwoza...there are places like Ngoshe, Kirawa, Ashigashiya, BokkoBarawaAgapalawa and many more along that axis that are still under the control of JAS... *– Female participant at the FGD (community, parents and victims) in Maiduguri, Borno State,1hApril, 2017*

We are seeing that the insurgency is gradually going back, we are happy now the peace has been returned, but it is not complete... *Excerpts from KII with Representative of People Living with Disability in Yobe State17 February, 2017*

...it is beginning to come to end...Well, I will say it is coming to an end in the sense that for instance, now in Damaturu ,I am talking about inside Damaturu, for the past maybe two or three months, I have not heard any gunshot or any bomb blast *– Excerpts from KII with Traditional leader inYobe state, 23 February, 2017*

40 Excerpts from KII with NCWS official, Yobe State, 17 Feb. 2017.

41 Report of the NSRP/ NIALS Data Analyst, p.18.

CHALLENGES OF RE-BUILDING AND RE-SETTLEMENT

Challenges faced by Community Leaders

The continuous influx of displaced people has placed huge pressure on host communities. Community leaders are faced with the challenge of using already sparse resources to ensuredisplaced people are settled with manageable shelter and given access to strained social amenities.

Community Mobilization

Traditional rulers play a key role as mediators in settling communal problems. They are often called on to resolvefamily quarrels as a form of alternative dispute resolution, and play a role in mobilizing citizens'civic and national duties. With increased migration of people from volatile to less volatile communities, community leaders are burdened with having to coordinate and mobilise a larger number of people.

Challenges of Community Policing

Interviews with community leaders in Borno State show how traditional and community leaders play a crucial role in the fight against insurgency. One local government could have many *Bulamas*, *Lawans* and up to 4 or 5 district heads working as community leaders, depending on the size of the local government and its ancestral customs. All of these traditional rulers are involved in community policing through well-established informal channels of communication. On matters of security, district heads report directly to divisional police officers. Many community leaders have become vulnerable to attacks from JAS as a result of their efforts to combat the insurgency, posing a risk to individuals and the effectiveness of community policing.

Challenges Faced by Security/Vigilante Groups

With the synergy between security operatives, Civilian JTF in Borno State and the Hunters and Vigilante groups in Yobe State, the insurgency has been significantly reduced in recent months. In Borno state, it was observed that the army has been able to secure the borders of the states to preventJAS from gaining access even though there have been records of intermittent entries and bombings in recent times, particularly between April and July 2017. The casualty levels had drastically reduced between 2014 and mid-2017. However, casualties have been recorded between June and August 2017 in Borno State where pockets of attacks by JAShave been recorded.Nevertheless, it was observed in Borno State that there is also distrust between the people and the army leading to gaps in effective communication needed for intelligence gathering.

It was also observed from questionnaires administered to vigilante groups in *Kukareta* IDP camp, Yobe State that there is a perception that security operatives are inhibited by a lack of modern equipment, transportation, inadequate manpower and training.

On the other hand, the research discovered that the Civilian JTF in Borno State and Hunter/Vigilante groups in Yobe State are closer to the people and are privy to knowledge and information of the identities and whereabouts of the insurgents. Consequently, both groups have used this intelligence to capture and overpower members of JAS, thereby restoring the trust and confidence of the people.[42]However, these local CJTF's, Hunters and Vigilante Groups also suffer from a lack of modern equipment and training.

...**Due to the insurgency, security operatives are reluctant to be posted to volatile areas...this affects the availability of quality manpower deployed to fight the insurgency..**." – *Excerpts from KII with Police Official, Damaturu, Yobe State, 23 February, 2017.*

*"...**As of now the only challenge I face is the threat on my life... but I will continue doing my job.***–Excerpt KII with Male CSO,Yobe State University, Damaturu Yobe State, 20 February, 2017.

Challenges faced by People with Disabilities

People with disabilities are particularly vulnerable during conflict and insecurity, due to their impaired ability to flee or self-protect from violence, and their typically weaker social and economic status.

> ***Our people were killed during the insurgency.About 10 of my members also lost their lives and others were badly injured. We cannot run for our lives...***- KII with Chairman, Cripple Association of Yobe State. [43]

Challenges Faced by Victims

Insurgency has deeply affected many communities in Borno and Yobe states, with thousands of lives lost, children orphaned, and people left homeless and without employment.In the face of such challenges, many victims are continually reminded of the impact the insurgency has had on their lives and communities.

Women and girls who have been subjected to physical and sexual violence often have little or no access to health, legal or psychosocial support. Those who have been displaced can find themselves in overcrowded camps with little or no privacy. Women and girls living in camps are at higher risk of experiencing sexual and gender based violence, both within the camps themselves and outside of the camps as they travel to collect water and firewood. Many victims have been exiled from their communities due to the stigma of being associated with JAS; this is particularly true for women and girls who have become pregnant. Children orphaned by the insurgency are

42. KII with Community Leader of rural IDP Camp, Yobe State, 18 February 2017.
43. KII with Chairman, Cripple Association, Yobe State, 17 Feb. 2017.

also left to struggle for welfare with other children, and can face similar ostracization and stigma.

In camp settings, international, national and local aid and humanitarian organisations are working to provide necessary support such as tent construction items, drugs, food and non-food items, and in some instances, cash.[44]In some instances this support is also extended to makeshift camps that are not officially set up by the government. In formal camps, the presence of security personnel (local vigilante and conventional law enforcement agents) helps to ensure safety of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). In informal camps, an absence of formal security provision means that community leaders are often left responsible for ensuring the safety and security of IDPs, through the setting up of a local security outfit (vigilante and hunter group) to provide security.

Most of the respondents' complained that the relief materials provided by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) are grossly inadequate compared to what is availablefrom NGOs. They also commented that if not for the assistance from the NGOs, the situation of the IDPs would have been far worse. However, the respondentsexpressed their appreciation to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Action against Hunger, Danish Refugees Council, World Food Programme (WFP), Catholic Relief Services, and International Rescue Committee amongst others. The participants further urged Government at all levels to intensify the assistance given to IDPs.[45]

44. KII with Traditional Ruler in Yobe State, 17 Feb 2017.
45 Excerpts from FDG Report Yobe State, p. 3

4. DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF DE-RADICALIZED PARTICIPANTS (INSURGENTS AND VICTIMS)

Radicalization means the process leading to radicalism: an extreme shift in attitudes, beliefs and practices that depart significantly from the mainstream in society. As a process, radicalization is necessarily relativebecause it depends on contexts and perspectives. What counts as radical in one context may be considered moderate in another context.[46]

The UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that leads to Terrorism adopted a definition of de-radicalisation proposed by John Horgan. They describe it as 'programmes that are generally directed against individuals who have become radical with the aim of reintegrating them into society or at least dissuading them from violence.'[47] These programmes may entail amnesty, counseling, deprogramming, dialogue, demobilisation, disbandment, disengagement, reconciliation and reintegration.[48]

De-radicalizing is the process of becoming less radical – renouncing radical action, views, attitudes and affiliation to radical movements as well.[49] This process of 'becoming less radical' applies both to behaviour and beliefs. With regard to behaviour, this primarily involves the cessation of violent actions. With regard to beliefs, this involves an increase in confidence in the system, a desire to once more be a part of society, and the rejection of non-democratic means. In general, the de-radicalisation of behaviour is linked with the de-radicalisation of beliefs.[50]

De-radicalisation of behaviour and beliefs also refers to affected communities, as de-radicalisation typically includes the rehabilitation and reintegration of de-radicalised individuals. A key focus of counter-radicalisation efforts is therefore on the strengthening and empowering of communities from which radicalized individuals emerged. Building the resilience of communities can

46 ONSA Policy Brief 'Understanding the complex causes and processes of radicalisation' at 3, available at *http://www.nsrp-nigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/PB-1-Causes-and-Processes.pdf,* accessed on 8th May 2017.

47 Institute for Strategic Dialogue, *Tackling Extremism: De-Radicalisation and Disengagement* (Copenhagen: Conference Report, 8-9 May 2012), pp. 1-2.

48 John Horgan and Max Taylor, 'Disengagement, De-radicalisation and the Arc of Terrorism: Future Directions for Research', in Rik Coolsaet (Ed.), *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experiences,* 2nd edition (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), p. 175.

49 ONSA Policy Brief (n 51), 3.

50 Froukje Demant, Marieke Slootman, Frank Buijs, Jean Tillie, *Decline and Disengagement: An Analysis of Processes of De-radicalisation* (Amsterdam: Institute for Migration & Ethnic Studies [IMES], 2008), p. 13.

help to guard against the emergence of terrorism. Thus, in the overall process of rehabilitation and reintegration the more deradicalised participants acknowledge their actions, assume responsibility, express regret, show empathy and concern for victims, and offer reparation..[51]

The programme started by Nigeria's Defence Ministry, 'Operation Safe Corridor,' is geared towards rehabilitating and reintegrating the repentant and surrendering JAS members back into normal life in the society.[52] The National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) was also set up in order to reduce the risks of terrorism and ensure that people go about their lives freely and with confidence. It is organized around five streams aimed to forestall, secure, identify, prepare and implement with key objectives and indicators to effectively ensure monitoring and evaluating successes at each stage. The programme utilises existing structures within and outside government to deliver targeted programmes and activities that further the overall objective of stemming the tide of radicalism. The soft approach programmes provide the country a framework that identifies roles and responsibilities of every segment of the society.[53]

However, from the FGDs and the KIIs, most respondents do not foresee the possibility of rehabilitation plans for terrorists in the communities from which they originated. At the FGD in Yobe State, the Group consisting of community, victims and IDPs were emphatic as to the unacceptability of members of JAS living with them. One of the participants of this group described a situation where a son killed his father as a crime against humanity that cannot be forgotten. The indiscriminate killing of civilians by JAS was also noted as a crime against humanity. A similar response to reintegration of terrorist in their communities was displayed by the FGD groups in Borno. The FGDs made up of security and law enforcement agencies in both states appeared to be receptive towards proposed measures, which government and other concerned stakeholders can adopt to rehabilitate and de-radicalise the insurgents. However, they strongly expressed pessimism at the idea of re-integrating them into the society, and suggested that insurgents should be rehabilitated outside of the communities in which they had committed their crimes. A Civil Defence Personnel was of

51. Ervin Staub*Overcoming Evil: Genocide, violent conflict and terrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) in* Ervin Staub 'Reconciliation: Principles, practices and interventions in Rwanda' Paper prepared for the Global Challenges Conference 'Justice and Imagination: Building Peace in Post-Conflict Societies,' Mount Holyoke College, February 28 – March 1 2014 at 10, available at https://www.mtholyoke.edu/sites/default/files/global/docs/Staub%20paper.pdf, accessed on 22nd July 2017.

52 'Nigerian gov't sets up camp for repentant Boko Haram fighters' available at *http://www.africanews.com/2016/04/07/nigerian-gov-t-sets-up-camp-for-repentant-boko-haram-fighters//*, accessed on 20April 17.

53 'NACTEST: Osinbajo and the Revised Counter-Insurgency Campaign' available at *http://yashuaib.com/economy/nactest-osinbajo-and-the-revised-counter-insurgency-campaign/*, accessed on 20 April 2017.

the view that government should not make the mistake of taking measures to integrate those people into their localities, as this would create another form of insurgency.

> **...when you go to a place like Uliadi, Koriri, the places were burnt down by the insurgency and they lost their capital. Some lost their farm produce, so they need more assistance from both hands i.e. from government and non-governmental organisations in order to make their life steady...***Excerpts from KII with Male Representative of CSO at a Tertiary Institution,Yobe State, 20 February 2017*

The issue of reintegration was consistently discussed with expressions of resentment and injustice.

MANAGING EXPECTATIONS

Persons affected by insurgency in the North East, including those with special needs such as those living with disability and the elderly, are heavily dependent on individuals and organisations providing intervention and relief programs.. Diverse expectations exist among the victims flowing from varied losses suffered.

> ***What people need more now is to go back to their localities and they want the government to build their homes, create job opportunities for them or help them with dry season farming..."***[54]

The majority of respondents in IDP camps (90%) believe that compensation for losses (90%) and therapy (84%) are most important in dealing with the past. Several government and non-governmental agencies through their intervention in the region, provide relief materials such as tent construction items, drugs, food and non-food items and in some instances, cash.

54 Excerpt from KII with NGO official in Borno State, 23 February 2017.

NGOs have tried to supply food items to several camps in the state. Government agencies through State Emergency Agency (SEMA), National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and other agencies have contributed to the supply of relief materials, food items, health facilities and other needs to the victims in the state. The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and traditional Leaders have equally contributed greatly towards mitigating the effects of insurgency in the state. - *Male Respondent FGD Group A, (Community/Parents/Victims), Borno State, 12 April 2017*

I remember some of our peoples before that insurgency, they were going to school, and some are doing business. When the JAS insurgency came, most of them left school and also some left the business they were doing. That is why we need assistance with their education and business.... Excerpt from KII with *Male Representative of People Living with Disability in Yobe State, 17 February 2017*

However, respondents from the in-depth interview believe that the focus of interventions should not be on cash payments or hand-outs as compensation for loss suffered. Such a programme creates overdependence on providers of the intervention.

They are expecting too much because some of them have become too greedy and some people have beneficiary items, some have six, seven, some have nothing. You know if you want to live in spirit of community, if you have two, you can even share one or something, but they [the people] are unable to do some of this..... Excerpt of KII with *Community leader from Borno State, 21February 2017*

The general perception of respondents at the in-depth interview was that consultation and engaging representatives of various groups in victim communities in decision-making processes, serves the purpose of managing expectations positively. This prevents duplication of efforts and waste. Engaging the representatives of victims in the roadmap helps in identifying needs of communities. This enables the provision of relevant support as opposed to support based on the assumptions of government agencies or NGOs.

....when you take decisions, include people, include women, include children or the youth if you like to call it, and it exceeds what is for. For example, government establishes something that is not needed in a particular place. For example, if area A is looking for maybe potable water for their own consumption and their animals, you go and build them maybe a primary school, or because it is important.Their own immediate need is not the education, so what we want them to do is to merge the two, make them include them in decision making....

Respondents identified the need for collaboration with religious and traditional leaders, as they are the gatekeepers who manage expectations and communicate with community members. Proper communication and

collaboration with interest groups within the community will enhance relationships and prevent backlash. Participants identified that the publication of a detailed guideline for implementing relief programs as well as publicising criteria for selection and participation would strengthen trust and transparency.

> **....we lost our parents, sons and grandsons to the cold hands of death due to insurgency attack. We equally lost our homes, our properties and physical cash. Though whatever given to us as compensation would never bring back our dead, but it would go a long way to revive our means of livelihoods and have our destroyed homes renovated.** – *Participant at the FGD Group A (Community,/Parents/ Victims)Borno State, 12 April 2017*

Role Of Institutions In The North East In Preventing Reprisals And Consequences Of The Insurgency

PERCEPTIONS ON REQUIRED ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS

Participants in the research generally agreed that psychosocial support and counseling can mitigate the trauma of the past and reduce victims' urge to retaliate.[55] Respondents concurred that several institutions - government and non-governmental alike have roles to play in preventing reprisals and managing the consequences of the insurgency. Respondents affirm that several donor agencies such as National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) provide food and non-food items to IDPs as well as health, water and sanitary facilities to ease their suffering.[56]

SECURITY AGENCIES

Confidence in the security of the communities is also an important factor for victims of insurgency in the North East if the experiences of the past are to be adequately dealt with. The respondents affirm the presence of security personnel (both local vigilante and conventional law enforcement agents) in and around the camp to ensure safety of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as an indication that Government is fully participating in making sure all local government area are liberated.[57] These security agencies play a role in post-insurgency communities to ensure safety and security of life and property.

55 Excerpts from FGD Reports (Yobe State and Borno State).
56 Excerpts from FGD Reports (Yobe State and Borno State).
57 Excerpts from FGD Report, Yobe State.

Our role in the post insurgency is to form a synergy with community and other concerned stakeholders to ensure safety of life and property of the people. We are also going to engage people in community policing as one alternative to checkmate insecurity in our community. - *Participant, FGD Group B (Security/Law Enforcement Agents and Public Officers), Yobe State, 12 April 2017*

VIEWS ON RE-INTEGRATION

Respondents expressed varied views about re-integration of insurgents into their communities. The victims vehemently disagreed with the option of having persons who renounced membership of JAS live in the same community with them. Participants in the interviews and FGDs from Borno were more open to possible re-integration of de-radicalised insurgents but expressed the view that members of the groupdid not seem willing to engage in the reconciliation and re-integration process.[58]

RE-INTEGRATION AND REVENGE SEEKING

We are not against whatever measures government and other concerned stakeholders can take to rehabilitate and de-radicalise the insurgents, but the idea of re-integrating them into the society would not see the light of the day because there are people victimised by insurgents that don't have a forgiving mind. Those crop of people can definitely go to any length to take revenge that would result in unhealthy situation that may jeopardise the reconciliation and healing drive. – *Participant, FGD Group B(Security/Law Enforcement Agents and Public Officers) , Yobe State, 12 April 2017*

We will not live with them, or trust them; they killed our people and relations. We will not return and live with them in the same community forever''. If government try to do this it would create more harm than good. Let government find a place different from where they commit atrocity to settle them'' *- Participant, FGD Group A (Community/Parents/Victims/IDPs) Yobe State, 12 April 2017*

It is good for them to return back to their communities, but it is difficult to grant them reintegration. The sect members were not willing to engage in any reconciliation. Even when the former President Jonathan and the current president called for reconciliation, none of them came out to embrace such gestures. – *Participant, FGD Group A(Community/Parents/Victims) Borno State, 12 April 2017*

A female participant from Yobe in the FGDs expressed more skepticism about re-integration and the outcome because some of the victims 'do not have a forgiving mind, and can go to any lengthy to take revenge that would result in an unhealthy situation that may jeopardise the reconciliation and

58 Excerpts from FGD Report, Borno State,p. 17 & 18.

healing drive.'[59] However, participants who are not entirely averse to re-integration of radicalised insurgents recommended the use of community sensitisation programmes for both victims and perpetuators to foster reconciliation and avoid reprisals.[60]

These diverse views indicate that re-integration may not currently be viable. To prevent the possibility of reprisals, there is a clear need for institutions to ensure that de-radicalised perpetuators are not introduced into the same communities at the curret time but kept in separate orientation camps. Additionally, it supports the position that institutions involved with victims and perpetrators of insurgency should engage distinct models for protection for the respective entities.

Both perpetrators and the victim, all of us are being encouraged to do the right thing, because the right thing is the only way out. It is the only thing that all of us are praying for... - *Excerpt from KII with Male Representative of the Igbo Community, Yobe State, 17 February 2017*

59 Female participant FGD Group B (Security/Law Enforecment Agents and Public Officers),, Yobe State, 7.

60. Excerpts from FGD Report, Yobe State, p. 7.

5. JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Justice, or more appropriately, criminal justice – which deals with accountability mechanisms for crimes – proceeds primarily from an individual liability basis for offences. Liability invariably takes the form of punishment of the offender but rarely compensation for the victim. Typically, when violent crimes reach levels that overwhelm the domestic criminal justice mechanism and compels resort to peace-building measures such as amnesty, reconciliation and compensation, the criminal justice system can realistically deal with a narrow range of cases that are grievous and compelling[61]. Several reasons account for this - the fear and intimidation of witnesses may hamper the collation of evidence or prosecutions; there may be layers of culpability extending even to law enforcement officials; or courts and penal institutions may be inadequate.

The two states studied, Yobe and Borno have a developed criminal justice system with the State judiciary comprising the High courts, the magistrates and the Sharia courts. The Federal High court complements this framework with jurisdiction over federal offences. The Ministries of Justice in both states is uniformly structured with the AG superintending over several directorates, including the office of the DPP. As in other parts of Nigeria, the primary responsibility for the investigation of crimes is vested in the Nigerian Police Force (NPF). However, under the Terrorism Prevention Act, the Office of the NationalSecurity Adviser (ONSA) coordinates counter terrorism enforcement action, which is undertaken by several agencies including the DSS and the Army.

JUSTICE AND ITS EFFECT ON THE HEALING PROCESS

The majority of respondents understood justice as a mechanism for achieving accountability by the state for some form of wrongdoing. For most respondents at the research location, this type of justice is very important and forgiveness comes after. So, while forgiveness is equally important, justice must come first before forgiveness.[62]

> ***Justice can go a long way in solving current crises and bringing satisfaction to the affected party, but accepting or rejecting JAS who renounce violence is left to the affected party.[63]***

The local security and other law enforcement agents in Yobe State stated that criminal punishment is the first measure to deal with past experience as victims can forget past bitter experience once justice is done. Punishment is

61 Godfrey Musila,'The Accountability Process In Kenya in Context Themes And Mechanisms,' Judiciary Watch Report (JWR) Vol 8 - *Addressing Impunity And Options For Justice In Kenya: Mechanisms, Issues And Debates* (2009) P. 18 – 19.

62 Excerpt from the FGD Borno State, p. 6.

63 FGD participant – official of a Government Agency in Borno State.

also viewed as a mechanism for dissuading potential perpetrators, through ending impunity for crimes committed.[64]

When asked about the relevance of justice to the process of healing and reconciliation, the majority of the respondents considered justice as an important factor in dealing with the past. They reasoned that victim suffering can in part be addressed through ensuring perpetrators are legally and proportionately dealt with.

In Borno State, some of the respondents described justice as fairness, impartiality and equality without favouritism.
Most respondents (86.3%) believed that apprehended JAS members should face criminal punishment. However, about 42% believed granting amnesty is necessary for peace and reconciliation while 43.6% believed that de-radicalized insurgents can be rehabilitated. However, 61% of the respondents believed that advocating for reconciliation and reintegration of insurgents into the community is a good cause.





Figure 8: Opinion of Respondents on whether apprehended JAS members should face criminal punishment or not



64 Excerpt from the FGD Report, Yobe State, p. 5.

Figure 9: Opinion of respondents on rehabilitation and reintegration of insurgents by the Government

More of the respondents from Yobe State believe that apprehended insurgents should face criminal punishment while 44.3% of respondents in Borno and 39.1% of respondents in Yobe believed granting amnesty is necessary for peace and reconciliation. 35.4% of respondents from Yobe and 49% from Borno believed that de-radicalized insurgents could be rehabilitated.

It is better they face the law, than allowing them to stay because they have renounced. But if government can do justice, let's say they fish out the true JAS and take responsibility for them.[That] is better, than allowing them to come back and stay inside the community-*Excerpt from KII with Male Representative from Tertiary Institution in Yobe State, 17 February 2017*

Based on the statement I received from a lot of IDPs, they are demanding for justice on JAS. It is very few that are saying they should be pardoned. They will never be accepted by the community.- *Male Representative from Government Agency at FGD,Borno State, 12 April 2017*

Some suspected members of JAS involved in all these killings and destructions were not properly prosecuted because there was no evidence to prove the innocence of the suspects. In the process, many suspected JAS members did not receive the much-needed attention and were not treated with speed to dispense justice to the suspects. There was/is no political will to prosecute the culprits . . . People are dissatisfied with the past experiences of how people handled cases relating to insurgents and how people lost confidence in the judiciary because of lack of political will. *–Participant, FGD Group B(Security/Law Enforcement Agencies), Borno State, 12 April 2017*

There were mixed feelings with regards to the possibility of accepting a JAS member who had renounced violence, with many participants demanding justice in light of the suffering they had endured. They believed that renouncing terrorism would not undo what has been done. Similarly, faith and traditional leaders who participated in the study commonly expressed the opinion that the insurgency is a will of Allah, and did not show willingness to accept perpetrators who had renounced JAS. However, other victims believed Allah had nothing to do with it and due justice must be meted out on the offenders to serve as deterrence to others.

PROSECUTIONS AND PROTECTING VICTIMS/WITNESSES

There has been minimal success in the prosecution of members of the JAS terrorist group. From 2009 to December 2016, there are over 939 cases of JAS insurgents at the trial stage, with only one conviction recorded.[65]The stagnation of these prosecutions is mostly as a result of lack of evidence, lack of legal representation for

65 Kabiru Sokoto, a kingpin of the Boko Haram Group was found guilty of masterminding the Christmas day bomb blast that killed about 44 persons and wounded 75 others at St. Theresa's Catholic Church at Madalla, Nigeria in 2011. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Federal High Court, Abuja on December 20th, 2013. 'Christmas Day Bomber, Kabiru Sokoto, still in custody, says Prisons' spokesman,' The Vanguard, September 14, 2016, available at *http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/09/christmas-day-bomber-kabiru-sokoto-still-custody-says-prisons-spokesman-2/*, accessed on 27 April 2017.

the defendants, absence of the prosecutor, or transfer of defendants to unknown locations in Abuja, outside the court's jurisdiction, while the trial is in process.[66]

Many victims of abduction and their family members expressed frustration with what they perceived to be the lack of investigation and prosecution by government authorities for the crimes committed against them. Many abduction victims noted their disappointment in security officials for failing to interview them as part of an effort to identify the perpetrators.[67]

Almost all the respondents in Yobe, Maiduguri and Borno believed that appropriate punishment should be meted out to JAS member who willingly surrender or are arrested.byforce.

With full cooperation from community leadership, government and non-governmental agencies, rehabilitation and sensitization programmes for both victims and perpetrator arepossible and will yield positive results. Participants suggested several approaches to protecting victims and perpetrators of insurgency from reprisals, stigma and trauma.

Actually, people (they) cannot stigmatize them much, because the government on their part…the federal government are trying themselves, they are trying, at least by treating them, check their health first before they bring them back to the society…, so I am sure that at the end, nobody will stigmatize them. - *Excerpt from KII with Male Representative of Igbo Community, Yobe State, 17th February 2017*

Nigeria, being a member of the International Criminal Court (ICC), could borrow from the procedure of the Court in providing for and protecting victims and witnesses. The Rome Statute provides that there should be appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychosocial well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses and that in doing so, regard must be given to all relevant factors, including age, gender, health, and the nature of the crime, particularly, but not limited to, where the crime involves sexual or gender violence or violence against children. All these measures should be taken into account particularly during investigation and prosecution, and these measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused toa fair and impartial trial.[68]

66 'Those Terrible Weeks in their Camp' Boko Haram Violence against Women and Girls in Northeast Nigeria, Human Rights Watch, 2014, available at*https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria1014web.pdf* accessed on 20 April, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 'Spiralling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria', October 11, 2012, pp. 78-88; Michael Olugbode, 'Boko Haram: Trial of Suspects Adjourned,' This Day, November 2, 2011.

67 'Those Terrible Weeks in their Camp' Boko Haram Violence against Women and Girls in Northeast Nigeria, Human Rights Watch, 2014, available at*https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria1014web.pdf*, accessed on 20 April, 2017.

68 Article 68 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1999.

6. HEALING AND RECONCILIATION PROCESS

The diversity of conflicts meanthat achieving healing and reconciliation will require the adoption of processes defined within the context. This means that a consideration of peculiarities such as the socio-demographic characteristics, religious diversities as well as the availability of human and financial capacity to undertake the process of reconciliation is imperative in the North East. The insurgency left behind a range of effects for a majority of the participants – physical injuries, economic loss (as a result of destruction of property and means of financial independence) and physiological trauma. Most of the respondents agree that the perceived current need of the people revolves around rehabilitation and empowerment, which government and NGOs are currently undertaking in the region. The general perceptions of persons affected by the insurgency was that government and other non-governmental organisations are engaged in facilitating peace and stability in the North East. 84.3% of the respondents agree that government through their various agencies, are engaged in activities that promote healing and reconciliation. Similarly, participants of the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were aware of the intervention especially by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) working round the clock to ensure the provision of the necessary support, which victims need.[69]

It is important to consider the relevance of interventions and relief programs adopted by government and NGOs against the perceived needs of the population. Such programmes help victims to accept and deal with past experiences, necessary for re-connecting the people and establishing harmony in the long run as well as preventing reprisals.

THE METHODOLOGY AND TIMING OF INTERVENTION PROGRAMS IN THE NORTH EAST

Intervention and relief programs are being implemented in the North East, in spite of the fact that the insurgency has not been fully eradicated. This situation reflects a phased approach to dealing with the past, as opposed to a holistic approach, which requires that insurgency be fully eradicated before interventions, and relief programs are executed.

Participants in the in-depth interviews and FGDs generally agree that the phased or staged approach to peace and rehabilitation which has been adopted by government and the NGOs is a suitable process for the North East.[70] Findings of the research indicate that attending to the needs of liberated communities in phases (even as insurgency is not entirely eradicated) allows testing of intervention models which could be extended to

69 Excerpts from FGD Report, Borno State, p 4; Report of the NSRP/NIALS Data Analyst, p 18; Excerpts from FGD Report, Yobe State p 3.

70 Report of the NSRP/NIALS Data Analyst, p 25 & 26; Excerpts from FGD Report, Borno State p 20.

other communities when the situation improves. This approach allows the possibility of modification to meet the specific needs of a particular community where necessary.

See, you cannot carry out these things holistically and you must use some communities as your starting point so as to serve as a model. So if you try it and you see that you succeed, then you go and develop another place… - Excerpt of KII with Male *Representative of NGO, Yobe state, 17 February 2017"*

…it is good to do it phase by phase, even if you finish assessment and you see there is improvement then you improve your methods, then go to the next phase… otherwise we will commit the same mistake again…' – Excerpt of KII with a female *Representative of an NGO, Borno State, 21 February 2017*

If there are resources, it is better the government does it at once – Female Participant, *FGD Group B (Security/Law Enforcement and Public Officials)Borno State, 12 April 2017*

In the same vein, a phased approach in dealing with the past is more desirable than a holistic approach because it ensures that people in locations that have been liberated receive timely support to assist them to resume their trade or vocation. However, participants of the FGDs see limited resources as a major determining factor in how the phased intervention approach is carried out in the North East. Where the financial resources are available, carrying out interventions concurrently is desirable.
Respondents observed that the phased intervention requires transparency for optimal results. The participants suggestliaising with both secular and religious leaders from the communities to the local government areas. This represents a bottom-top model relationship, with the communities at the bottom and first point of intervention; towns at intermediary level and the local government areas at the top.

At the community level, registration of peopleaffected by the insurgency helps data collection and implementation and coordination of relief programs, which respondents identify as a challenge.[71]

RECONCILIATION AND THE DE-RADICALIZATION PROGRAMME

The general response of respondents to these programs and their perception about re-integration of de-radicalized participants can be assessed from their present views of JAS. The FGDs engaged participants on several ramifications of the programme. In particular the potential release of de-radicalized terrorists back into society (reintegration) raises challenging questions — where will they go? Who will monitor them? Will they re-offend? Can they be turned away from terrorism while in prison? Will any recidivism rate prove acceptable to the public? In addition to the security challenges raised by issues to do with changing terrorist behaviour, resentment and

71. KII with representative of Centre for Research and Capacity Development and Humanitarian Centre, Yobe State University, 16February 2017.

feelings of injustice among victims of terrorism accompany even preliminary discussions about these issues.[72] A large section of the respondents (86.8%) believe members of JAS are human but most (72.3%) would feel no sympathy if they saw a member of the group suffer. Furthermore, many (66.1%) of them would not help a repentant JAS. The feeling of resentment and injustice is still there even as many (52.2%) of the respondents admitted to frequent thoughts of revenge[73].

Reconciliation has been described as 'more than coexistence, that is, formerly hostile groups living near each other or simply interacting and working together. Reconciliation requires that members of the two groups come to see the humanity of one another. It means coming to accept each other and develop mutual trust.'[74] Hence, it was observed that discussing reconciliation usually elicits some level of tension especially in the host communities. Even though reconciliation could be discussed without inhibition in the IDPs camps, tension usually arose out of misconception of issues. Displaced Christians and Muslims are indeed kept in separate IDP camps for fear of religious conflicts. This speaks to the fundamental issue of the possibility of achieving reconciliation and reintegration among the various communities affected by insurgency. For the respondents, reconciliation may come only after justice has been done, compensation paid and punishmentmeted out.[75]

About 42% believe granting amnesty is necessary for peace and reconciliation while 43.6% believe that de-radicalized insurgents can be rehabilitated. 61% of the respondents believe that advocating for reconciliation and reintegration of insurgents into the community is worthwhile, but that in order to achieve this, there must be healing and dealing with the past to ensure durable peace.

72 John Horgan and Kurt Braddock 'Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs,' available at*http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/rehabilitating-terrorists-challenges-assessing-effectiveness-de-radicalization-programs*, accessed on 22 April 2017.

73 See Table 1 on Respondents State of Mind on JAS.

. Ervin Staub 'Genocide and Mass Killings: Origins, Prevention, Healing and Reconciliation' (2000) 212 *Political Psychology* 367.

75 Focus Group Discussion Yobe State, p.5.

Views on Rehabilitation and reintegration of insurgents	Number	Percentage
Apprehended members of the sect should face Criminal punishment	2594	86.3
Granting Amnesty is necessary for peace and reconciliation	1271	42.3
De-Radicalized insurgents can be rehabilitated	1310	43.6
Want Advocacy for reconciliation and reintegration of insurgents	1833	61.0

Table 2: Views on Rehabilitation and reintegration of insurgents Yobe and Borno

For most respondents (about 90%), dealing with the past must start with compensation. Even though they asserted that no amount of money or any material can compensate for a life lost, since most of their homes and places of business were destroyed there is need to compensate victims forreconstruction of damaged property and to ensure security for the victims to return to their places of residence and pick up pieces of their lives again. By so doing, the psychosocial trauma they were subjected to can be lessened.

Also, more than 84% of the respondents' believe that healing therapy for victims is necessary to achieve durable peace in the North East, while about 53.3% reported that they have been able to mourn the death of family members who died as a result of the insurgency. Furthermore, while about 49% believe it is better for victims of the insurgency to talk about their past experience, 45.1% believe persons affected by the insurgency will heal without talking about their experiences. 47% of the respondents believed that by working together, victims of the JAS insurgency can assist their children heal and have a better life.

The respondents (86.3%) also believe that apprehended JAS members should face criminal punishment. The majority of respondents regard justice as amajor means to deal with past experiences. Seeing perpetrators face the wrath of the law arguably helps victims to recover from the violence they have experienced.

Reintegration is however hinged on the ability of the victims to forgive and move on with their lives. 48.5% of the respondents realise that forgiveness is necessary to enable them live with former members of the JAS. This is quite crucial since about 86.6% of respondents believe that JAS has the greatest blame for the violence and death experienced. In fact, only 9.5% of respondents believe government has the largest blame and less than 2% of

respondents attributed the carnage to vandals and community leaders. Some of the respondents are of the view that if given the opportunity, they would definitely take revenge on insurgents. They noted that they have never been subjected to such atrocity and as such it would be difficult to forgive the insurgents. They admit they could over time forget the harm they suffered but cannot forgive. A few of the respondents however stated that if the insurgents genuinely regretted their actions, they may forgive them and forge ahead. However, the respondents strongly believe that JAS extremists are not repentant.

Fewer youths aged between 16 to 30 years would be willing to forgive and resume normal activities with repentant insurgents. This emphasizes even more forcibly the need to de-radicalize the community as a whole for a successful re-integration to take place. Religion could be a common ground for all parties to come together and forgive each other. Both Islam and Christianity preach forgiveness and so it might provide a meeting point. However, most respondents do not believe that any of the insurgents are repentant and forgiveness cannot take place without repentance. **Government may need to drive more re-integration programmes that emphasize the religious mandate to forgive.**




Figure 10: Distribution of respondents who believe they could begin to forgive JAS members by age group




Figure 11. **Distribution of respondents who would work with repentant JAS member by age group**

An understanding of the insurgent'sindividual psychology is another important aspect of re-radicalisation. Psychologists who study terrorism have been claiming for decades that there is no terrorist personality and that terrorists are psychologically 'normal.' Even if true, it seems highly unlikely that a person would remain 'normal' after having spent several years killing innocents. Setting aside the question of personal trauma, a consideration of the impact of the insurgentlife-style explains the complexity. Exposure to violence, especially for those who become fighters, can cause lasting changes in the body and mind. Terrorists are 'at war,' at least from their perspective, and like soldiers, they, too, may be at risk for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).[76] Moreover, those who have been detained may have been subjected to acts of violence that leaves them too damaged to adjust to the community.

Therefore, reintegration efforts should be based first and foremost on a clear understanding of what motivates people to join terrorist movements and what motivates them to leave. Terrorist movements often arise in reaction to a perceived injustice, as a means to right some terrible wrong, real or imagined. The report of the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation noted that:

> ***Ideology appears as an important and constant factor in the radicalisation process towards terrorism. Ideological indoctrination plays a crucial role in turning a small but significant minority dissatisfied with existing social and political arrangements into militants. Ideology contributes to the acceptance of violence as a method to bring about political change and also leads to the creation***

76 Jessica Stern 'De-radicalization or Disengagement of Terrorists Is It Possible'? Koret-Taube Task Force on National Security and Law, 8, available at *http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/futurechallenges_stern.pdf*, accessed on 15 May 2017.

> ***of a subculture of violence. Ideology is used to reduce potential moral inhibitors and to justify the resort to extreme methods from a broader repertoire of methods of waging political conflict. Cognitive frameworks derived from certain exclusive ideologies have been used to build collective identities based on narratives of violent struggle.***[77]

Yet ideology is not the only, or even the most important, factor in an individual's decision to join a terrorist group.

A KII respondent when asked what he understood as the ideology motivating the JAS to carry out physical violence, killings and destruction of property, attributed it to the high level of unemployment in the state. He added that the major motivating factor to engage in physical violence is unemployment. He narrated that many youth were doing menial jobs and were denied the opportunity of white-collar jobs in the state. He cautioned that government needs to be proactive to avert similar incidences, otherwise the problems of unemployment will continue to serve as catalyst for social vices and terrorism. He added further that he knew someone that was persuaded with the amount of N400,000 (Four hundred thousand Nigerian naira)[78] to join JAS group.

While existing research does not point to a correlation between poverty and terrorism,[79] it does not mean that poor people, in countries with high levels of unemployment, aren't particularly vulnerable to recruitment, especially as cannon fodder. Where that is the case, job training, career counselling, and assistance in finding productive work may be the best counter-radicalization strategy — at least as important as religious re-education. Participants in this research in particular, encouraged the government to provide jobs for teeming youth as a big solution to the problem.

Some individuals join terrorist groups as true believers in an idea, but evolve, over time, into professional killers. Once that happens, the emotional and material benefits of belonging can become more important than the spiritual benefits of belief. This suggests that some terrorists might develop enduring reasons—perhaps even a compulsion—to pursue violence. Government must therefore consider difficult trade-offs. This understanding — that ideology is not the only, or even the principal reason that individuals are drawn to terrorist groups — needs to be incorporated into counterterrorism efforts, especially when re-radicalization is considered. It also makes it clear that even if

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77 Reprinted in R. Coolsaet (Ed.), J*ihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge*. *European and American Experiences,* 2nd ed., (Farnham: Ashate, 2011), pp. 269-88.

78 Approximately 1000 US Dollars (conversion at the present exchange rate of 1 USD = 400 Nigerian Naira as at 22July 2017.

79 Alan B. Kruger, *What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007); Alberto Abadie, 'Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,'(2006) 96 (2) *American Economic Review,* pp. 50-56.

terrorists achieve their purported objectives, they may continue to fight for other motives.

Consequently, there were mixed feelings on the possibility of accepting any JAS member who renounces violence. Many of the participants demanded justice and mentioned the degree of trauma they suffered and the loss of life and property, including displacement from their homes. People found it difficult to accept the perpetrators even if they renounce terrorism. They believe that renouncing terrorism would not undo what has been done. Similarly, faith and traditional leaders who participated in the study opined that the insurgency is the will of Allah were not showing acceptance for perpetrators. Other victims believe Allah has nothing to do with it and due justice must be demonstrated on the offenders to serve as a deterrent to others. (See Table 1 above).

VIEWS ON JUSTICE, FORGIVENESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

It is better they face the law, than allowing them to stay because they have renounced. But if government can do justice, let say they fish out the true JAS and take responsibility for them, it is better, than allowing them to come back and stay inside the community.. – *Excerpt from KII with male respondent of a Tertiary Institution Yobe State, 17 February 2017.*

Based on the statement I received from a lot of IDPs, they are demanding for justice on JAS. It is very few that are saying they should be pardoned. They will never be accepted by the community – Participant/Official of Government Agency, *FGD Group B (Security/Law Enforcement Agencies), Borno State, 12 April 2017*

Justice can go a long way in solving current crises and bringing satisfaction to the affected party but accepting or rejecting JAS who renounce violence is left to the affected party...- Participant/Official of Government Agency,
FGD Group B (Security/Law Enforcement Agencies), Borno state, 12 April 2017

There is need for reconciliation. It is not an issue of justice. Some of the JAS, they are not real JAS, they are just victims of circumstances. They were there when JAS captured some people, they will just give them a gun, they will ask them to go. If you don't shoot, the security will shoot at you. So you don't have any alternative rather than to shoot the security. Sit down with them [insurgents]...ask them why, how – *Excerpts from KII with Male Traditional leader, Yobe State, 21 February 2017*

People can forgive if ...there will be a solution to it...people can make mistakes and we can convince them to make you understand. Nothing is too much to forgive, we usually pray to God to forgive us so that is that –*Excerpts from KII with Male Representative of the Igbo Community, Yobe State, 17 February 2017*

The general consensus among local security and other law enforcement agents is that de-radicalisation, rehabilitation and amnesty should only be

granted to those who were forced to join the JAS or joined without knowing the real motive behind this ideology. The group'sleaders and their lieutenants who were arrested either at the war front or through intelligence should face the full wrath of law. That should then be followed by de-radicalization of the insurgents.

These security and law enforcement agents note that such deradicalization can be done by involving scholars of repute to neutralise the radical tendencies in their minds as such criminal tendencies can only be eradicated through imparting useful knowledge. Extreme ideology they say, can only be neutralised with sound knowledge and counselling. Indeed, the UN Security Council stressed the importance of addressing conditions and factors leading to the rise of radicalization to violence and violent extremism amongst youth, which can be conducive to terrorism. Member States were encouraged to engage local communities and non-governmental actors 'in developing strategies to counter the violent extremist narrative that can incite terrorist acts.' They were also encouraged to address conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism by empowering youth, families, women, religious, cultural, education leaders and other concerned groups in civil society, and by adopting 'tailored approaches' to counter recruitment to violent extremism.[80]

PERCEPTION OF DE-RADICALIZED PARTICIPANTS (DP) WITH REGARDS TO RETURNING BACK TO THEIR COMMUNITIES

The first reaction to efforts to return DPs to their communities is indignation. Despite affirmation from security agencies, many are not convinced that it is safe to return to their communities. A vigilante stated:

> ***How can you kill and slaughter people like rams and expect those people to come and stay under the same roof with their victims? Please, government should think twice.***[81]

The vigilantes believe that the only solution is for government and other stakeholders to settle the insurgents outside the community where they have operated and killed. However, a member of a vigilante group in Yobe State also said they have managed to clear thousands of insurgents in villages within Gulani and Gujba local government areas and that the village dwellers have also stated their readiness to return and protect their community if given the clearance by the military. These are clear signals that the JAS insurgency is definitely winding down.

Two members of the Hunters Group and Vigilantes Group, Yobe State respectively stated as follows:

80 UN resolution 2250 (2015), available *at http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12149.doc.htm*, accessed on20 April 2017.

81 FGD with CJTF/Vigilante Groups, Yobe State, 12th April 2017

The war against insurgency has recorded tremendous improvement in our communities compared to two years ago. Because before now we were virtually in a gun battle with the insurgents whenever we received security reports on their whereabouts. We were sometimes attacked in our base or ambushed and we recorded casualties, but Alhamdulillah, these scenarios are becoming things of the past now. We also call on Government to put more efforts and provide logistic support to us. By so doing, we can be able to nip any threat in the bud right from its initial stage.[82]

There is also unanimous agreement among respondents that relative peace was recorded in almost all parts of the state. This is glaring as some communities have already returned to their towns and villages. There is also hope that the remaining communities will soon be safe enough for people to return.




Figure 12: Reason for not returning home among displaced persons living in IDP camp

82 FGD with CJTF/Vigilante Groups Yobe State, 12th April 2017

7. POST–CONFLICT RECONCILIATION MEASURES AND THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES

The general perception of respondents is that the government through its agencies such as State Emergency Agency (SEMA), National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), NSCDC, CJTF, etc. and non-governmental agencies has in the past two years provided support for people affected by the insurgency. They have been deeply involved in healing, rehabilitation, reconciliation and support to IDP camps. For instance, organisations such as the Centre for Integrated Development and Research (CIDR) has supplemented government efforts towards rehabilitation of victims of insurgency for more than three years. UNICEF has provided healthcare, food and shelter for victims of the insurgency while NSCDC has provided security, intelligence gathering and sharing in collaboration with the JTF. Additionally, Save the Children has provided psychosocial support through implementation of child friendly spaces where victims are taught about child abuse, violence, drugs and sexual abuse.

In Borno and Yobe States, particularly in communities and IDP camps, there have been notable successes in post-conflict reconciliation efforts, in part as a result of effective collaboration between the government, affected communities, and aid and humanitarian organisations. Provision of childcare and education has been enhanced within the IDP camps and affected communities, while victims have been engaged in entrepreneurship activities, with more than 400 youth in Borno State benefiting from the launch by the Borno State Government of Operation Back to School for drop-out youths.[83] Boreholes were provided to stem the spread ofof cholera and better hygiene was maintained to control further outbreaks in the IDP camps. In addition, co-operation was establishedthrough the security agency forum where members meet regularly to assess the situation of insurgency and share intelligence. With the support of Child Protection Network (CPN), reporting of child abuse, rape, child marriages and violence to the National Human Rights Commission, Legal Aid Council and Federation of Women Lawyers has improved in Borno State.[84] Significant efforts in Yobe State included intervention from thePalace of the Emir of Damaturu in assisting IDPs before the government took over.[85] At the village level, camps were set up and village heads were provided with food and other essential commodities until the government support arrived.[86] Also, SEMA and NEMA introduced expertswho taught people humanitarian issues and prepared them for the days ahead. NDE organized training for youths and provided employment

83. NSRP/NIALS Analyst's Report, April 11 2017, p. 17.
84. NSRP/NIALS Analyst's Report, April 11, 2017 p. 17.
85. KII with Community Leader, Damaturu, 18 February 2017.
86. *Ibid*.

opportunities especially in the agricultural sector while persons living with disability received helpfrom the government.

PERCEPTION OF PEOPLE ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT

Perceptions ofthe adequacy of government efforts shows about 84.3% of respondents believe that government is doing enough to ensure peace and stability while 27.8% of the respondents believe nothing extra is required to facilitate peace and justice.

Respondents in both Borno and Yobe believe the government is doing enough to ensure peace and stability in those states. Respondents from Borno were more optimistic on this than respondents from Yobe. 85.1% of the respondents in Borno compared to the 83.1% in Yobe believe that the government is doing enough to ensure peace and stability. 28.1% of respondents in Bornobelieve nothing extra is required to facilitate peace and justice, while 27.1% of the respondents in Yobe also believe nothing extra is required to be done to promote peace and justice.

SECURITY MECHANISMS EMPLOYED BY GOVERNMENT TO PROTECT THE STATE AND OTHER EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

As part of Government's efforts to tackle terrorism, the Terrorism Prevention Act was enacted in 2011 and amended in 2013 to ensure prosecution of persons involved in acts of financing terrorism and terrorism itself. The Military Base was relocated to the North East (operation *lafia dole*) to further intensify the fight against insurgency. Additionally, a Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) was set up to compliment the efforts of the Nigerian Army and other security agencies; a de-radicalization program ('Operation Safe Corridor) was established for the purposes of reintegrating and rehabilitating repentant terrorists; and a soft approach to countering violent extremism (National Counter Terrorism Strategy, NACTEST) was adopted by the Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA) in 2014 and revised in 2016. This approach is geared towards stemming the tide of terrorism, countering the narratives of extreme socio-political and religious ideologists and reducing the potential for radicalisation.

At the FGD held in Yobe State, respondents noted the increased support provided to the military, vigilante and hunters groups and local security agents, and the positive impact this has had on allowing displaced people to return to their communities. It was also noted that the state government is providing monthly stipends to the local security agents ranging between ₦50,000 - ₦70,000 (equivalent to 165 US Dollars), which has motivated local security bodies. The presence of military and other security personnel stationed in liberated communities was noted to be one of the measures that the government has taken to rebuild the confidence of displaced people to return to their homes.

In order to ensure that the security measures put in place by the Government achieve the desired results, it was noted by a representative of the Commissioner of Police that it is the duty of every citizen to alert the security forces toany suspicious movements. He stressed that teenagers and children should learn such patriotic practices from parents for a safer and more secure society. A participant at the FGD in Maiduguri observed thus -

> ***"My opinion is about security, the (people) should be very observant and also more emphasis should be placed on religious tolerance …."***[87]

PROTECTION OF VICTIMS: REHABILITATION, COUNSELLING, MEDICAL ATTENTION, MONETARY COMPENSATION

Government has been supporting affected victims to heal and deal with the trauma through collaboration with NGOs, both locally and internationally. Through this collaboration in Borno and Yobe States, avenues for interactive sessions and recreational centres for fun games were provided. Trainings and vocational workshops were also provided to make people feel at home and continue their lives. Specifically, organizations such as Civil Liberty Organization (CLO) provide victims with psychosocial support, grief and trauma counseling. The National Human Rights Commission, Federation of Women Lawyers, Child Protection Network, Women in New Initiative in Nigeria and other NGOs also support victims to access justice. [88]

Currently, government is fully participating in making sure all the affected local government areas are liberated and people living in IDP camps return home. Participation in social activities such as dance, football and other games organized by the agencies is helping people in IDP camps deal with the trauma by enhancing healing and bonding. Government has also collaborated with other NGOs (both local and international) and individuals (Traditional, Religious and community Leaders) to support the victims by creating some vocational/workshop training to make them comfortable. Most of the victims were willing to participate, while others were motivated by the actions of others.

Nine out of 10 respondents at the FGD Yobe State stated that they lost family members, property and savings as a result of the insurgency. They noted that compensation from government for their losses would be much appreciated.

> ***The Government should try to make people understand and accept that this [the insurgency] is not coming back, not ever. This will make people to maybe at least forget some of these things, and another thing is at least create…for children, create a kind of desired culturally accepted activities, like local wrestling, instead of these football activities, create a local activity that is within their area, for***

87 Participant, FGD Group C(Public Officers)in Maiduguri, Borno State, 12 April 2017

88. See KII with Leader of rural IDP Camp in Damaturu, Yobe State, 18 February 2017.

people to know, so that they will grow up with their culture….[89]

Government is actually making effort to see to some of the problems and help some of the victims. We have registered some and they are getting some benefits because part of the assistance I think we can give is for them to have a sustainable livelihood and to feel that they are being cared for, so this is something that government is doing and some of the organizations are doing…" [90]

Efforts Of NGOs In Protecting The Victims I.E. Rehabilitation, Counseling, Medical Attention, Monetary Compensation

The research determined that NGOs are providing much of the humanitarian and development assistance in northeast Nigeria. Hence, most of the KIIs with community leaders, village heads and heads of IDP camps in Borno and Yobe States suggest that NGO interventions should strengthen collaboration with government to identify where assistance is required, workwith the victims to determine immediate needs, and provide appropriate medical, psychosocial and legal services as well as access to justice and compensation. They should also conduct detailed investigation of alleged acts of abuse, discrimination and marginalisation against victims, expose the facts, and pressurise the relevant authorities to take action to secure justice and compensation for victims.[91]

NGO representatives in Borno State revealed that during the course of their work, they face serious problems especially when insurgency denies them access to those in need. Sometimes, insurgentgroups demand payoffs, and local violence threatens the safety and lives of field personnel.NGOs experience considerable challenges in the discharge of their duties,often caused by the activities of the insurgents.[92]

Notwithstanding the efforts of these agencies, there is stilla great deal to be done for people in the North East, particularly in terms of re-orientation of the people's expectations, and specific provisions geared towards the welfare of victims of the insurgency.

89 Excerpt from KII with MaleRetired Civil servant from Yobe State,21 February 2017.

90 Excerpt from KII with Representative of Government Agency in Borno State, 21 February 2017

91 'The Criminal Justice Response to Support Victims of Acts of Terrorism' available at *http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/victims_rights_e-book_en.pdf,*accessed on 26 April, 2017.

92 The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Peace Building in Maiduguri, Nigeria, available at*http://nairaproject.com/projects/880.htm,l* accessed on 17 April 2017.

8. CONCLUSION

This research reveals conflicting but deep seated perceptions about JAS, and its members. The preponderant view is that the JAS insurgency is not fueled by religious ideologies but fanaticism and poverty. The JAS targets jobless youths and young girls/women between the ages of 18 and 30 years. While on the one hand accepting that many members of JAS were lured or forcibly conscripted into the conflict, there was a strong inclination to exert revenge on former insurgents and a general distrust of the sincerity of de-radicalised insurgents. The general view is that **efforts to re-integrate former participants of the insurgency into their former communities should be discouraged**.

Justice i.e. holding perpetrators accountable under the criminal law was considered an important condition for sustainable peace and the mitigation of the trauma of many victims of the insurgency. There was dissatisfaction with the efforts by the State to make perpetrators accountable for their crimes. However,law enforcement agencies expressed frustration at lack of material evidence or the inability or unwillingness of witnesses to assist with the prosecution of suspects.

Compensation, in terms of providing livelihoods or restoration of property, was also cited as effective means of enhancing healing and the rehabilitation of victims. Particular attention is also being paid by Government agencies, international humanitarian and Non-governmental organisations to psycho-social support and counselling of the victims. Although the pace and reach of these interventions is slow and stretched compared to the high expectations of the people and communities, it was considered important to engage the representatives of victims in identifying needs of communities and the delivery of support.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

The present study has raised concerns about the need for justice, healing and reconciliation in the North East through an understandingof the experiences of victims of the JAS insurgents. The issues centre around re-integration of the de-radicalized participants back into the community; the general perceptions of justice with regards to these DPs; the roles of government and non-governmental agencies in putting effective mechanisms in place to facilitate the healing process; and protection of victims. Based on the findings from these issues, the recommendations below are proffered. It should be noted that some of these recommendations comefrom the respondents at the research locations and from the participants at the validation workshops.

Government Agencies at Federal, State and Local Government Levels should:

- Provide psychosocial support and counseling for victims before adopting measures for reconciliation. This is expected to helpvictims deal with the past experience and reduce trauma.
- increase access of victims to basic amenities in the IDP camps and improve infrastructure in the communities affected by the insurgency.
- Empower the youths and women with job opportunities and/or soft loans to enable them start-up businesses.
- Collaborate with inter-govermental humanitarian organisations and NGOs in providing capacity building to empower victims and encourage entrepreneurship. This will enhance ability of victims to fend for themselves.
- In the short term, any resettlement of de-radicalised fighters should be away from their former communities and areas where they committed crimes.
- Intensify sensitization programs in affected communities for victims and residents with a view to countering the urge for retaliation or avoid reprisals.
- Integrate the Social Investment Policies such as the conditional cash transfer into measures for peace for the North East. Clear guidelines, however, should be set for implementing relief programs for the people withpublished criteria to enhance transparency and trust.
- Assist CJTF in the most affected communities, and co-opt local vigilantes and other security agents who have been helpful in the fight against insurgency, and strategize to protect the liberated communities against further attacks and exposure to insurgent activities.

IN PARTICULAR

- National and State Emergency Services should establish a clearer Emergency Policy framework setting out the duties and responsibilities of each tier of government towards providing support to ensure effective coordination

- State Agencies should empower traditional justice systems to address minor grievances before they escalate.
- The Federal Ministry of Justice and the federal judiciary should fast-track trial and accountability procedures, paying particular attention to the protection of witnesses and vulnerable persons
- Security Agencies should -
    - forge strong links with CJTF in most affected communities, and co-opt the local vigilantes and other security agencies who have been helpful in the fight against insurgency
    - Ensure collaboration between liberated communities and traditional rulers, hunters, CJTF and Youth in order to ensure sustainable peace.
    - Increase the number of security agents in each community, strengthen security at borders, and continue regional co-operation and collaboration with MNJTF to ensure peace and security in Nigeria and neighbouring countries.

International organisations, particularly providers of humanitarian and relief services should:

- Continue to support the Federal and State Government in a coordinated manner with emphasis on the provision of technical expertise and resources to reduce trauma and rehabilitate victims
- Provide comparative best practices on reconciliation and rehabilitation drawing from other regions
- Assist in the raising of funds to address specific needs of the people of the North East
- Support research work for the purpose of gathering and analyzing data on the scope and impact of the North East crisis.

Non-Governmental Organisations should:

- Continue in the provision of business skills, psychosocial support though counselling, education and safe space program for peer-to-peer interaction to improve the ability of affected persons to earn a living and start saving for the future.
- Continue in the monitoring and reporting of state efforts and activities particularly in ensuring the equitable distribution of relief materials and the observance of international best practices in the treatment of victims and vulnerable groups
- improve coordination of interventions with regards to the needs or services they are to provide for victims to reduce duplication
- Ensure greater transparency in the coordination of their mandate. Towards this end a network of NGOs should construct a website where all NGOs can post their intervention for monitoring and evaluation.

Local Communities, especially traditional and religious leaders should:

- Collaborate with Government and NGOs in efforts to counter violent extremism amongst youths and participate in the government de-radicalization programme
- Strengthen traditional justice systems to address minor grievances before they escalate.
- Continue to work with Government to encourage victims to return to their former communities byidentifying government interventionsfor infrastructure and essential services;
- Collaborate with Government to provide and sustain livelihoods for victims, youths and vulnerable groups